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NEW CHALLENGES FOR OLD DESIRES

The condominium' has generated renewed interest in the development of techniques for privately controlling the use and occupancy of
land. Condominiums are in reality vertical communities with intricate
systems of private self-government 2 and expense-sharing mechanisms.'
* Acknowledgement is gratefully accorded the Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund, Orlando,
Florida, which contributes annually to the University of Miami School of Law, to encourage
academic research in property law. This is one of a series of published articles sponsored by
the Fund.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami.
*** Assistant Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. The term condominium is used generally to denote a system of separate ownership
of individual units in multiple unit buildings. In addition to the separate ownership interest
acquired in a particular apartment, each unit owner is also a tenant in common in the
underlying fee and in the spaces and building parts used in common by all the unit owners.
See generally 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, ch. 39, Cooperatives and Condominium (1964); 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, ch. 54, Cooperative and Condominium Apartments (1964); ROHAN & RESKiN, Comoins xum LAW AND PRACTICE (1965); Berger,
Condominium: Shelter On A Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987 (1963); Cribbet,
Condominium-Home Ownership for Megalopolis, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1207 (1963); Friedman
& Herbert, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CALIF. L. REv.
299 (1962); McCaughan, The Florida Condominium Act Applied, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 1
(1964); Rohan, Condominium Housing: A Purchaser's Perspective, 17 STAN. L. REV. 842
(1965); Gregory, The California Condominium Bill, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 189 (1963) (part of
a comprehensive symposia in that issue); Note, 15 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 203 (1962).
2. Condominium statutes generally provide that management of the structure shall be
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The need for attaining and preserving therein communities of compatible and financially responsible members is self-evident. Devices to
accomplish this must not violate any existing rule of law or public policy,
must not be so financially burdensome as to discourage mortgagees and
prospective purchasers of individual parcels, and must not be so restrictive as to traditional ownership rights as to be objectionable to those who
wish to "own" their own apartment or commercial unit.
Regulatory schemes and techniques have existed for some time in
the development of the traditional "horizontal" community. The use of
possibilities of reverter4 and rights of re-entry5 incident to limitations on
the fee have not proved satisfactory because of the general repugnance
against purchasing less than an absolute fee, because of the possibility
(however remote) of a purchaser having his estate forfeited, because of
the reluctance of mortgagees to accept as security such defeasible fees,
and in short, because of the general unmarketability of such titles. Restrictive covenants6 have been generally fairly successful and widely
employed to regulate the use and occupancy of the horizontal subdivision.
However, racially discriminatory covenants, until recently rather frequently employed, are now unenforceable. 7 Further, an unfortunate byproduct of restrictive covenants is the frequent cluttering of titles by
antiquated and outmoded restrictions of no remaining utility.'
The right of first refusal, or pre-emption, is a device that might be
employed to control the sale and occupancy of land parcels in either a vertical or horizontal subdivision. A pre-emption is a deed restriction which
reserves to the grantor the first right to repurchase the conveyed property
when and if the grantee subsequently desires to sellY The primary purthe responsibility of an association of apartment or unit owners. A brief analysis of 26
statutes and the Federal Housing Authority model act is contained in 4 PowErL, REAL
PROPERTY, ff 633.22 (1964).

3. See generally 4 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, for a resume of statutory provisions.
4. A possibility of reverter is the interest retained by the grantor fee simple owner
when he creates a fee simple determinable. Upon the happening of the condition upon which
the defeasible fee is limited, the estate granted automatically reverts to the grantor. See
generally 2 POwELL, op. cit. supra note 2, 11187, 271; 1 BOY'ER, op. cit. supra note 1, §§
18.02, 22.03.
5. A right of re-entry or power of termination is the interest retained by the grantor
fee simple owner when he creates a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. Upon
happening of the condition upon which the defeasible fee is limited, the grantor has the
188,
power to terminate the estate granted. See generally 2 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, 1111
272; 1 BOYER, op. cit supra note 1, §§ 18.03, 22.03.
6. Restrictive covenants are contractual provisions or promises respecting the use of
land. Breach of a covenant results not in a forfeiture of the estate, but instead authorizes
the non-breaching beneficial parties to bring an action either for damages or for equitable
relief. See generally 5 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, IIf 670-686; 1 BOYER, op. cit. supra note
1, §§ '24.01-.14.
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953);
Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc., 116 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1959).
8. See generally Botts, Removal of Outmoded Restrictions, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 428 (1955).
9. See authorities cited infra notes 10, 33.
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pose of such a provision is to enable the grantor to reacquire the property
and not to prevent the owner from disposing of it.'" The owner is free to
sell provided he first offers the property to the grantor. Although the
traditional pre-emption accords the grantor the right to repurchase, a
similar right might also be given to a third party. In fact, it is believed
that the most common and practical use of such a provision is to give the
pre-emption right to a property or apartment owner's association in a
horizontal or vertical subdivision." In any event, as used in this paper,
the term pre-emption, or its equivalents, is used to include those instances
where the "right" to purchase is accorded a third party or entity as well
as those instances when it is accorded the grantor.
II.

TRADITIONAL POLICY OF FREE ALIENATION

The common law has long abhorred any restraint on alienation.,In fact, a basic tenet of property law is that the right to convey is an
incident of ownership which cannot be subverted by the imposition of
restraints by the grantor.' The basis for the rule is that public policy
prefers that property be kept in the ordinary channels of commerce and
trade so as to promote its improvement and optimum use. 4 Naturally, the
question as to whether public policy is violated in a particular instance
depends upon the degree to which alienation is actually affected according
to the terms of the provision in issue.
10. SIrms & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1154 (2d ed. 1956); Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich.
347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955); In re Water Front, 246 N.Y. 1, 157 N.E. 911 (1927).
11. See, for example: Rohan, Condominium Housing: A Purchaser's Perspective, 17
STAN. L. REV. 842, 860-862 (1965) ; 14 HASTINGS L.J. 316 (1963).
Following the Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants, considerable interest
was engendered in ways of overcoming the effect of the decision. Frequently suggested
plans included the requirement that a purchaser join a club or property owner's association;
the requirement of consent by a club or small group for the occupancy or sale of particular
units, and the use of pre-emptions. See, as illustrative: Notes, Circumvention of The Rule
Against Enforcement of Racially Restrictive Covenants, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 493 (1949);
Discrimination in Ownership and Occupancy of Property since Shelley v. Kraemer, 1952
U.C.L.A. INTRA. L. REV. 14 (1952).
This article is concerned only with the pre-emption as a regulatory device for attaining
socially acceptable objectives and not for its possible use to further discrimination or other
unworthy objectives.
The use of pre-emptions to control horizontal subdivisions is illustrated by the following: Gale v. York Center Community Co-op, 21 Ill. App. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960);
Beets v. Tyler, 290 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. 1956); Lauderbaugh v. Williams, 409 Pa. 351, 186
A.2d 39 (1962); Mt. Springs Ass'n v. Wilson, 81 N.J. Super. 564, 196 A.2d 270 (1963).
12. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.63 (Casner ed. 1952).
13. 41 Am. JuR., Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 66 (1942).
14. Such a policy is thought to be beneficial to a progressive society, the growth of
which is dependent upon the opportunity to exercise individual initiative. Restrictions on
the transfer of land tend to restrain the extension of credit and operate to prevent creditors
from satisfying their claims. Such restrictions take property out of commerce by destroying
its marketability and tend to prevent its improvement by impairing the land owner's
ability to secure credit by mortgaging his interest or ability to sell to another who can
finance the needed improvement. This inability in the long run is detrimental to society as
a whole.
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The right of pre-emption, as well as any other regulatory scheme, in
order to successfully accomplish the purpose of controlling the use of land,
may, depending upon the jurisdiction, have to pass three distinct tests
relating to direct and indirect restraints on alienation. These tests are:
the rule against perpetuities; " the rule against suspension of the absolute
power of alienation; 6 and the rule against direct restraints on alienation. 1 7 Space considerations require that the scope of this article be
restricted to situations dealing with rights of first refusal so that ordinary
option contracts and options connected with leases are generally excluded. 18 In addition, no attempt has been made to exhaust the implica15. The common law rule against perpetuities and the statutory rule against the
suspension of the absolute power of alienation were designed to cope with the problems of
indirect restraint on alienation. The former rule requires that contingent future interests
in land must vest, if at all, within the period of the rule. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 24.1-.6 (Casner ed. 1952); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942);
Sim.s, & SnwTn, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1222 (2d ed. 1956). See infra Part IV.
16. The rule against suspension fixes the period during which the absolute power of
alienation may lawfully be suspended by the creation of future interests. The power of
alienation is suspended so long as there are no persons in being by whom an absolute
interest in possession can be conveyed. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 25.1-.118 (Casner
ed. 1952); SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1415, 1416 (1956); Fraser & Sammis,
The California Rules Against Restraints on Alienation, Suspension of the Absolute Power
of Alienation and Perpetuities, 4 HASTINGS L.J. 101 (1953). See infra Part V.
17. The common law rule against restraints on alienation was designed to prevent
conveyors of estates in fee simple from restricting the power of alienation by the conveyee.
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§

26.1-.5

(Casner ed. 1952);

SraEs & SMITH, FUTURE

INTERESTS §§ 1112, 1131 (1956) ; Norvell, The Power of Alienation: Direct Restraint vs.
Suspension, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 894 (1956).
18. For cases dealing with options to purchase realty when appendant to a lease, see
Long v. Hirs, 270 Ala. 131, 116 So.2d 605 (1959); Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 138, 68
Pac. 587 (1902) (option to purchase in lease held not to violate statute limiting suspension
of alienation). Keogh v. Peck, 316 I1. App. 318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925) (court specifically
enforced option to purchase appendant to a lease); Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply
Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Atl. 442 (1908) (court specifically enforced option to purchase
appendant to a ninety-nine year lease).
For a discussion of options for renewal in leases, see Orr v. Doubleday, Page & Co.,
223 N.Y. 334, 119 N.E. 552 (1918); Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S.E. 983 (1914).
For cases involving unlimited options in gross to purchase realty, see Eastman Marble
Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920); Winsor v. Mills, 157
Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352 (1892) ; In re Lilley, 272 Pa. 143, 116 Atl. 392 (1922) ; Barton v.
Thaw, '246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914); Starcher v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S.E. 524
(1923); Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193, 85 S.E. 170 (1915); London & So. W. Ry. Co.
v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882).
For decisions dealing with options to purchase stock (personalty), see Warner &
Swasey Co. v. Rusterholz, 41 F. Supp. 498 (D. Minn. 1941); Greene v. E. H. Rollins &
Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (1938); Lawson v. Household Fin. Co., 17 Del.
Ch. 1, 147 Atl. 312 (1929); New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E.
432 (1894); Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N.E. 991 (1910);
State ex rel. Everett Trust & Say. Bank v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash. 2d 844, 157
P.2d 707 (1945).
See also Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89 (1923) (grantee's
option to purchase adjoining land of grantor when latter desired to sell); Wing, Inc. v.
Arnold, 107 So.2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959)(leasee's option to purchase not subject to rule
against perpetuities); Weitzmann v. Weitzmann, 87 Ind. App. 236, 161 N.E. 385 (1928)
(option to purchase located in will of decedent).
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tions of each of the rules relating to restraints on alienation except to the
extent that they affect rights of first refusal.19
The discussion begins with an analysis of deed covenants which
reserve or create a right of first refusal.
III.

CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION

The relatively recent case of Blair v. Kingsley,2" held that the
grantor's reservation of the right of first refusal was valid, regardless of
whether it be called an option or a pre-emption, and under the terms of
the provision in issue, in the opinion of the authors, the court was manifestly correct, at least insofar as the rule against perpetuities was concerned. 2 ' The proper classification of provisions reserving or creating a
right of repurchase is difficult and is often characterized by considerable
confusion. It is those situations which involve the exercise of a right to
purchase (or repurchase) on the happening of a condition that are most
troublesome. There is both a tendency toward a proliferation of descriptive labels and a lack of critical analysis in terms of the actual purpose
19. For a thorough discussion of the history and future of the rule against perpetuities,
see GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942). See also Browder, Construction,

Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1963); Jones, Reforming The Law-The Rule Against Perpetuities, 22 MD. L. Rv. 269 (1962); Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts and Practitioners Can Do about the Follies of the Rule,
13 KAN. L. REv. 351 (1965); Lynn, Reforming the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,
28 U. CHI. L. REV. 488 (1961); Lynn, Perpetuities Reform: An Analysis of Developments
in England and the United States, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 508 (1965); Tudor, The Impact of
Recent Statutory Adoption of the "Wait and See" Principle on the Common Law Rule
Against Perpetuities,38 B.U.L. REv. 540 (1958).
For a complete examination of the statutory rule against the suspension of the absolute
power of alienation, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 25.1-.118 (Casner ed. 1952);
4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 370-449 (1944); Sim-Es & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1415-

1438 (2d ed. 1956); Fraser & Sammis, The California Rules Against Restraints on Alienation, Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation and Perpetuities, 4 HAsTNcs L.J. 101
(1952); Newman, Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienability, and the Duration of Trusts, 16
VAND. L. REV. 57 (1962); Norvell, The Power of Alienation: Direct Restraint vs. Suspension, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 894 (1956); Rundell, The Suspensions of the Absolute Power of
Alienation, 19 MicH. L. REV. 235 (1921) ; Turrentine, The Suspension Rule and Other Statutory Restrictions on Trusts and Future Interests in California, 9 HASTINoS L.J. 262 (1958).
For a complete analysis of the rule against restraints on alienation, see 41 Am. JUR.
Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation §§ 66-70 (1942); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 26.65-.66 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 404 (1944); Swms, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 437-44 (1936); Fraser, The Rule Against Restraints on Alienation, and Against
Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota, 9 MINN. L. REV. 314 (1925);

Fraser & Sammis, The California Rules Against Restraints on Alienation, Suspension of the
Absolute Power of Alienation and Perpetuities, 4 HASTINOS L.J. 101 (1952); Newman,
Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienability and the Duration of Trusts, 16 VA~m. L. REV. 57
(1962); Norvell, The Power of Alienation: Direct Restraints vs. Suspension, 31 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 894 (1956).

20. 128 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
21. The right of first refusal in the Blair case was limited to a period of twelve years.
It was therefore well within the period of the common law rule against perpetuities in effect
in Florida. The optionee in the case had a one-year period in which to exercise his election.
The reasonableness of such a period, and the possibility of its having the effect of imposing
an illegal direct restraint on alienation was not discussed. See also infra Part VI.
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and effect of the provision on alienability. Prima facie similarities may in
fact contain significant differences, and divergent appellations may in fact
conceal important similarities.
Conditions on which a repurchase right is predicated can be divided
into at least two categories: ( 1 ) the desire of the grantee to sell;2 and (2)
the failure of the grantee to perform some designated condition such as using the premises for a specified purpose or erecting a particular type of improvement." The two types of provisions have much in common and
many analytical comments pertaining to one are also applicable to the
other, but there is an essential difference as to the purpose of the condition. Provisions for purchase or repurchase dependent on either or both
types of conditions have been described or categorized variously as:
pre-emptions, 24 options to purchase or repurchase,2 5 conditional sales, 6
contracts to reconvey,2 7 conditional options to repurchase,28 repurchase
22. The cases cited infra note 24, except for Lantis v. Cook, are of this type.
23. Most of the cases cited infra notes 29-31 are of this type.
24. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919) (covenant not to
convey property without first giving grantor an opportunity to purchase); Old Mission
Peninsula School Dist. v. French, 362 Mich. 546, 107 N.W.2d 758 (1961) (clause in deed
gives grantor right to purchase property in event that grantee desires to sell); Lantis v.
Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955)(clause in deed, that if grantee did not wish
to use property as home, grantor had first right to purchase, was distinguished from preemption); Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955) (adjoining landowners
contracted for right of first preference if either desired to sell) ; Kamas State Bank v.
Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931 (1963) (reservation in deed of right of first refusal
in grantor if grantee desires to sell property); New Haven Trap Rock Co. v. Tata, 149
Conn. Supp. 181, 177 A.2d 798 (1962); Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D.
421 (1879) (covenant by vendee that if he desired to sell the property, he would give first
choice to vendor). See also 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, § 26.64 (Casner ed. 1952);
THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 3573 (1941).

25. Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957) (grantor's reservation of right
to repurchase in deed if grantee desires to sell) ; Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d
597 (10th Cir. 1951) (grantor's option to repurchase land if grantee fails to erect theatre
building or sells land); Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr.
272 (1960) (grantor reserved right to repurchase land if abandoned for school purposes);
H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 At. 138 (1919) (grantee covenanted
not to sell property without giving grantor first chance to purchase); Gilbert v. Union
College, 343 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. 1961) (repurchase option reserved by grantor if grantee
desired to sell property); Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950)
(provision in deed that if grantee desired to sell property, grantor would have first preference); Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W.2d 568 (1944) (grantor had option to
purchase if grantee desired to sell the land) ; Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225 N.W.
620 (1929) (option to purchase giving grantor right of first refusal); Windiate v. Lorman,
236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926) (option gave grantor first chance to buy property if
grantee desired to sell); Gange v. Hayes, 193 Ore. 51, 237 P.2d 196 (1951) (deed provided
that if grantee ceased operation of mill, then grantor had first right to repurchase) ; Hall v.
Crocker, 192 Tenn. App. 506, 241 S.W.2d 548 (1951) (grantor has option to repurchase if
grantee desires to sell the property).
26. Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890 (1892) (clause in deed reserving
right to repurchase in grantor when grantee desired to sell held void as illegal restraint on
alienation whether considered as a conditional sale or contract to reconvey).
27. Ibid.
28. Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931 (1963) (reservation
in deed of right of first refusal in grantor if grantee desires to sell property).
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options for condition violated," options to arise on condition precedent,"
contingent options to repurchase 8 and similar terms.82 A simplified classification along functional lines would appear most desirable.
Insofar as classification is concerned, two major classifications are
at once apparent: the pre-emption and the option. A pre-emption is
generally considered to reserve in the grantor, or vest in another, the right
of first refusal, which right may be exercised only if the grantee desires
to sell the property acquired by the original conveyance." On the other
hand, an option reserves in the grantor, or vests in another, a right of
election to purchase the property, whether or not the grantee desires to
sell.84 The distinction is clear in that a pre-emption does not confer on
the holder the power to compel an unwilling owner to sell, while an option
does grant such a power to the optionee.
Applying this distinction to the type of provisions previously differentiated, it is clear that the first type provision, providing for purchase
if the grantee-owner desires to sell, falls within the category of a preemption. The second type of provision for repurchase if the granteeowner fails to perform some specified condition falls within the category
of an option. Of course, it is not an ordinary option in gross1 5 but is an
option exercisable on the happening of a condition, namely, failure of the
grantee to do the act or acts specified. The condition is properly classified
as precedent in that its occurrence is a prerequisite to the exercise of the
option. On the other hand, since the occurrence of the condition can give
rise to the compulsory sale or reconveyance of the estate granted, it also
29. Gearhart v. West Lumber Co., 212 Ga. App. 25, 90 S.E.2d 10 (1955) (provision
in deed that if property not used for school then grantor shall have right to repurchase,
the text descriptive term in essence being incorporated into the deed).
30. Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955) (clause in deed that if grantee
did not wish to use property as home, grantor had first right to purchase).
31. Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1951) (grantor's option to
repurchase land if grantee fails to erect theatre or sells property); H. J. Lewis Oyster Co.
v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 At. 138 (1919) (covenant not to convey property without first
giving grantor an opportunity to purchase); Gange v. Hayes, 193 Ore. 51, 237 P.2d 196
(1951) (deed provided that if grantee ceased operation of mill, then grantor had first right
to repurchase) ; Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960)
(grantor reserved right to repurchase land if abandoned for school purposes).
32. Gange v. Hayes, supra note 31, also using the term right of redemption; and
Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, supra note 28, also using the term option to reconvey;
Genet v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 150 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963), using the term
condition subsequent for an option to repurchase reserved in the grantor if the grantees
failed to develop the land within two years as a warehouse.
33. Old Mission Peninsula School Dist. v. French, 362 Mich. 546, 107 N.W.2d 758
(1961); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64 (Casner ed. 1952); THOMPSON, REAL
PROPERTY § 3573 (1941).
34. Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1951) (owner of property
grants to another the privilege to purchase at the other party's choice); Gange v. Hayes,
193 Ore. 51, 237 P.2d 196 (1951); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (1914)
(covenant contained provision that grantor could repurchase the land if he desired).
35. See infra text to note 59.
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appears somewhat analogous to the grant of a fee simple on a condition
subsequent.8"
Adding to the possible confusion is the fact that the pre-emption is
not an interest wholly distinct from an option but, in fact, includes an
option within its context. The option within the pre-emption relates to
the right of election to purchase or refuse to purchase the propertyupon
the receipt of the offer by the owner desiring to sell. Clearly, at this point,
the holder of the pre-emption does have the sole option to purchase and
can compel the owner to convey or reconvey by an action for specific
performance.17 Conversely, the property owner, once he has evinced a
desire to sell and offers the property to the pre-emption holder, cannot sell
to another person until the property has been refused or the time for
election has lapsed.8"
The pre-emption is similar to the provision for repurchase upon
failure of the owner to perform a designated condition in that both are
exercisable on a condition precedent. In the pre-emption, the condition
precedent is the owner's desire to sell; in the other it is his failure to
perform a specific condition. The pre-emptionor has the right to purchase
in preference to anyone else, but he has such right only when the owner
desires to sell. In the case of an option generally, and in the case of an
option predicated on a condition other than the desire of the owner to
sell, the optionee can enforce a conveyance whether or not the owner
desires to sell. Thus, if the condition expressed is the failure to erect a
specified improvement, on breach of the condition the owner may still
wish to retain the land and may not desire to sell at all, but nevertheless
he must if the optionee exercises his right.
A few writers89 have been helpful in presenting clear analysis and
suggestions as to the proper relationship between pre-emptions and the
rules relating to alienation restraints. However, the tendency to use a
multiplicity of labels in fashioning descriptive terms tends toward a loss
of proper perspective in differentiating pre-emptions and related options.
The somewhat apt expression of "pre-emptive option"40 unfortunately
suggests similarity of treatment as to an ordinary option and pre-emption.
36. See infra note 74. Cf. Dozler v. Troy Drive-In-Theatre, Inc., infra note 48, employing the condition subsequent analogy, and Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, supra note 31,
rejecting the condition subsequent analogy.
37. Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S.E. 524 (1907) (specific performance
permitted whenever equitable right in property is established) ; New Haven Trap Rock Co.
v. Tata, 149 Conn. 181, 177 A.2d 798 (1962) (right of grantor, to exercise his privilege to
repurchase, arose when he received notice from the grantee that the grantee desired to sell
the property; at this point the grantor was entitled to specific performance).
38. THOMPsON, REAL PROPERTY § 3573 (1941).
39. E.g., 6 AvmRICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§ 26.66-.67 (Casner ed. 1952); S MEs &
S3uTn, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1154 (2d ed. 1956) ; 14 HASTINs L.J. 316 (1963).
40. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 771 (1963) ; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 413 (1944);
14 HASTINGS L.J. 316 (1963).
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Perhaps an unarticulated reason for the terminological inventiveness
of the courts is the desire to circumvent one or more of the rules of
property law which would otherwise serve to invalidate a right of first
refusal or similar provision." While there may be some justification for
resorting to these tactics in order to validate the clause in issue, it is
submitted that it would be preferable to alter the law when necessary, if
upholding the pre-emption seems desirable. The search for the most
descriptive label tends to make decisions unpredictable and somewhat
dependent upon the particular thrust accorded by the fortuitous nomenclature. 2
The proper relationship between the right of pre-emption and the
rule against perpetuities; the statutory rule against suspension of the
absolute power of alienation and the rule against direct restraints on
alienation will now be considered. For convenience of the reader and for
purposes of refreshing his memory, each rule is separately analyzed as to
its applicability, substance and effect upon invalidation.
IV.

THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

A. The Rule Stated
Since the Duke of Norfolk's Case,43 the common law rule against
perpetuities has restricted conveyors in imposing indirect restraints on
alienation. 4 It does this by invalidating remote indestructible contingent
interests.4 The classic statement of the rule is that "no interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest."46 Only the common law rule
41. See, for example, Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955). The clause
provided that if the grantees did not wish to use the property as a home, then the grantor
should have the first privilege to purchase the property. The court concluded that such a
clause was not equivalent to an option arising only if the optionor desires to sell the
property and as such pre-emptive. Rather, the court decided that the clause was only an
ordinary option to arise on a condition precedent. As a result, the court was able to remove
the provision from the purview of the rule against direct restraints on alienation and upheld
the validity of the clause. The court noted, however, that as a pre-emption it would have
probably been valid under Michigan law although probably invalid in other jurisdictions.
The common law rule against perpetuities was inapplicable to this deed executed when the
suspension statute was in effect, and the provision did not violate the suspension statute.
As construed, it would also not violate the rule against perpetuities because the condition
"not wishing" would necessarily arise at death of the optionors and the option would then
be exercisable.
42. See infra Part IV, subsection B as to the principal interests which are and which
are not subject to the rule against perpetuities. See also infra note 77.
43. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
44. GRAY, THE RULE AcAn ST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942); 2 SxmEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS §§ 479-94 (1936) ; Norvell, The Power of Alienation: Direct Restraint vs. Suspension, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 894 (1956).
45. The importance of indestructibility is emphasized in 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY,
1 767A[5] (1962 ed.). The rule "is in no way offended so long as a future interest remains
completely destructible at the uncontrolled will of a single person." Id. at 591.
46. The language of John Chipman Gray at 191, GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
§ 201 (4th ed. 1942). See also 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
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The modern "wait and see" and related modifications
is herein discussed.
47
are excluded.
Although the rule is immediately directed against remoteness of
vesting, its ultimate purpose is to prevent contingent interests from
clogging the legal title beyond a reasonable period of time. Thus, land is
48
kept more freely alienable and in the normal channels of commerce.
Disencumbered titles stimulate alienation, promote property improvement
and increase the value of the land to society. 49 The rule is used as a
surgeon's knife to cut out or remove those interests which are found
invalid.50
B. Interests Subject to the Rule
The rule against perpetuities applies only to provisions which create
some interest or estate in property. Rights and agreements strictly contractual are excluded."' Further, the52property interest or estate must be
contingent and not presently vested.
47. See generally 5 POWELL, supra note 45, ch. 75A for a discussion. The complete
"wait and see" rule, under which the validity of an interest is tested after (instead of
before) the events, actually transpire, is in effect in Pennsylvania, Vermont and Kentucky.
The state of Washington has similar legislation applicable to trusts.
Unlimited cy pres type statutes are in effect in Vermont and Kentucky, and in Washington as to trusts only. Under this type of statute, the courts, when confronted with void
interests, will reform the instrument so as to carry out the intent of the creator of the
instrument as far as possible.
Under modified "wait and see" legislation, adjudication of validity or invalidity of an
interest is postponed until the end of applicable lives in being. This type of provision is
in effect in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine and Maryland.
Limited cy pres statutes, applicable to contingent interests void because of the necessity
of reaching an age in excess of 21, and permitting the court to reduce the age contingency
to 21, are in effect in New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine and Maryland. New
Hampshire and Mississippi have adopted a similar rule by court decision.
'Citations to these statutes and decisions can be found in 5 POWELL, supra. See also
the articles cited supra, note 19, first paragraph.
48. Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theatre, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So.2d 537 (1956); Burton
v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914); Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193, 85 S.E. 170
(1915).
49. See generally 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 762, 767A (1962 ed.).
50. Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914).
51. Some courts at times have construed pre-emptions and similar provisions as
creating no definite interest in property so as to avoid the rule against perpetuities. Morgan
v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1951) (stated that option to repurchase
created in personam rights, not interest in property, but nevertheless held both statutory
and common law rule applicable since the title conveyed was encumbered by the agreement); Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960) (option
to repurchase said to create contingent, future right, not interest in property, so rule not
applicable, but the statement is dictum since the option was construed as personal with
the optionee and not assignable or transmissible, and the court did indicate that the
rule would be violated if the option were inheritable) ; Turner v. Peacock, 153 Ga. 870, 113
S.E. 585 (1922) (option to purchase additional land created a future interest in property,
so rule applicable); Dodd v. Rotterman, 330 Ill. 362, 161 N.E. 756 (1928) (option to repurchase created mere personal privilege, not interest in property, so rule not applicable, but
result sustainable on the construction that the right was not inheritable or transmissible);
Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925) (option to purchase placed in lease created
mere right to obtain interest, not an interest in property, so rule not applicable, but result
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An obvious

non-sustainable on proposition that lease options are excepted from the rule); Windiate
v. Leland, 246. Mich. 659, 225 N.W. 620 (1929) (option to repurchase created no property
right, so rule not applicable, but the statement is dictum and the holding that suspension
statute was not violated is supportable in any event).
Other courts do not follow the policy of construing such provisions as not involving
interests in land so as to avoid the rule against perpetuities. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v.
West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919) (pre-emption created contingent future interest,
so rule applicable); Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E.
177 (1920) (covenant to repurchase created equitable interest in land, so rule applicable);
Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N.E. 352 (1892) (consent of both parties required for
alienation, this created contingent future interest in the land, so rule applicable) ; Barton
v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (1914) (option to repurchase created substantial
interest in land, so rule applicable); Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193, 85 S.E. 170 (1915)
(option to repurchase created future interest, so rule applicable) ; Starcher Bros. v. Duty,
61 W. Va. 373, 56 S.E. 524 (1907) (option to purchase created equitable interest in land,
so rule applicable); London & So. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1880) (option
to purchase created executory interest in the property, so rule applicable).
See 5 POwFLL supra note 45, II 767B, as to contracts, 1 775 as to covenants, both of
which are excluded from the rule.
52. See for example, Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1951)
(option to repurchase created contingent interest, so rule applicable) ; H. J. Lewis Oyster
Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919) (pre-emption created contingent future
interest, so rule applicable) ; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N.E. 352 (1892) (consent
of both parties for alienation created contingent interests, so rule applicable); Barton v.
Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914) (option to repurchase created contingent interest, so
rule applicable).
Other courts avoid the rule against perpetuities by holding that the option creates a
vested interest. See Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theatres, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So.2d 537
(1956) (option to repurchase created presently vested conditional reservation similar to
power of termination so rule not applicable); Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11
Ch. D. 421 (1879) (pre-emption created presently vested interest, so rule not applicable
but this case was overruled by London and So. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, infra note 61).
Vested interests are excluded from the operation of the rule. See infra notes 66-71.
53. A contingent interest is an interest which is limited from taking effect by a condition
precedent. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Ad. 138 (1919); Lantis v.
Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312
(1914); SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 79 (1951).
54. Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957) (option to repurchase); H. J.
Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919) (pre-emption); Gearhart v.
West Lumber Co., 212 Ga. 25, 90 S.E.2d 10 (1955) (repurchase option for condition
violated); Turner v. Peacock, 153 Ga. 870, 113 S.E. 585 (1922) (option to purchase in
grantee); Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1124 (1918) (pre-emption); Gilbert v.
Union College, 343 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. 1961) (option to repurchase) ; Campbell v. Campbell,
313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950) (option to repurchase); Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky.
440, 177 S.W.2d 568 (1944) (option to repurchase); Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30
N.E.2d 392 (1940) (pre-emption); Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236
Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920) (covenant to repurchase) ; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass.
362, 32 N.E. 352 (1892) (consent of grantor needed for sale); Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich.
347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955) (option to arise on condition precedent); Windiate v. Lorman,
236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926) (option to repurchase) ; Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277
S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955) (pre-emption); Magee v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank &
Trust Co., 343 Mo. 1022, 124 S.W.2d 1121 (1938) (option to resell); Rice v. Lincoln &
N. W. Ry. Co., 88 Neb. 307, 129 N.W. 425 (1911) (option to purchase in grantee) ; Gange
v. Hayes, 193 Ore. 51, 237 P.2d 196 (1951) (conditional option to purchase); Barton v.
Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (1914) (option in grantor); Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn.
506, 241 S.W.2d 548 (1951) (option to repurchase); Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193,
85 S.E. 170 (1915) (option in grantor); Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S.E.
524 (1907) (option to purchase); London & So. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562
(1880) (covenant to repurchase).
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example is the executory interest 5 which, with one exception,

is subject

thereto." Another is the contingent remainder.5 Ordinary option contracts, particularly options in gross," are subject to the rule.60 The reason
is that the optionee, by exercising his option, can compel a conveyance of
the property. Thus, he has in effect a contingent future interest. English
law is in accord as to options generally."'
There are, however, two exceptions in American law to the rule that
option contracts are subject to the rule against perpetuities. The first
exception is an option to renew a lease for years,6 2 and the second, also
incident to a lease, is an option permitting the lessee to buy the reversion.65 Both exceptions escape the rule and are rationalized on the ground
55. An executory interest is generally considered as a non-vested interest, in favor of
a transferee, which is so limited that it will take effect in derogation of the preceding
vested estate upon the happening of a condition or the occurrence of an event certain to
take place. London & So. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1880); SIMEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 11 (1951); SMITH, REAL PROPERTY 147 (1956). An executory interest could
not exist at early common law; it could be created only after the enactment of the
Statute of Uses, [1536], 27 Hen. 8 c. 10 and the Statute of Wills, [1540], 32 Hen. 8 c. 1.
See Gange v. Hayes, 193 Ore. 51, 237 P.2d 196 (1951).
56. The exception is a springing type of executory interest limited to take effect in
possession at the expiration of a fixed period of time. 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 14,
46, comment a (1936); Sim s, FUTURE INTERESTS § 110 (1951).
57. London & So. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1880); Duke of Norfolk's
Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682); SmrES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 108 (1951). In
fact the rule against perpetuities was initially directed at executory interests.
58. A contingent remainder is an interest subject to a condition precedent, created
simultaneously with a prior estate, which is so limited that it can become a present
interest at the termination of the prior estate. SIwEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 10 (1951).
59. An option in gross is one in which the optionee has no other interest in the land
subject to the option. It is thus distinguishable from an option contained in a lease, or an
option generally incidental to some other interest in the land. Many option cases are
cited supra note 54.
60. Turner v. Peacock, 153 Ga. 870, 113 S.E. 585 (1922) (option in grantee to purchase
additional land); Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N.E. 352 (1892) (option to sell with
consent of grantor); MaGee v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 343 Mo. 1022,
124 S.W.2d 1121 (1938) (option in buyer to resell to grantor); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa.
348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914) (option in grantor to repurchase); Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va.
193, 85 S.E. 170 (1915) (option in grantor to repurchase); Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W.
Va. 373, 56 S.E. 524 (1907) (option to purchase); SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 110 (1951).
61. London & So. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1880). English law held that
options to renew leases were valid despite the rule, Bridges v. Hitchcock, 5 Bro. P.C. 6,
2 Eng. Rep. 498 ( P.C. 1715), but that options in leases to purchase the reversion were subject to the rule. Rider v. Ford (1923), 1 Ch. 541; Woodall v. Clifton (1905), 1 Ch. 257.
English legislation now exempts from the rule options in a lessee and restricts options
in gross to twenty-one years. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55,

§§ 9, 10.
62. Vokins v. McGaughey, 206 Ky. 42, 266 S.W. 907 (1924); Lloyd's Estate v. Mullan,
192 Miss. 62, 4 So.2d 282 (1941); Orr v. Doubleday, Page & Co., 223 N.Y. 334, 119 N.E.
552 (1918); Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S.E. 983 (1914). Such options have been
sustained almost universally as a recognized exception to the rule that options are subject
to the rule against perpetuities.
63. Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 146, 68 Pac. 587 (1902) (option to purchase in
lease did not violate statute limiting suspension of alienation); Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill.
318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925) (option to purchase appendant to lease); Hollander v. Central
Metal & Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 AtI. 442 (1908) (option to purchase appendant to
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that such provisions aid rather than retard alienability since they are
accepted commercial devices to aid in the disposition of property. 4
There are many types of interests which are excluded from the rule
against perpetuities. These interests are excluded either because they do
not create an interest or estate in property, 5 or because they are vested
interests"6 which are not subject to the rule. Vested interests6 7 not subject
to the rule,6" include reversions, 9 vested remainders7" and present possessory interests. In addition, certain contingent future interests reserved
to or remaining in the grantor are not subject to the common law rule
because of historical reasons. 72 These interests are the possibility of
reverter7 8 and the power of termination. 74 Since these interests are forninety-nine year lease); Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So.2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959) (option
to purchase held by lessee during term of lease).
64. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 110 (1951). In addition, such options stimulate the
improvement of land. See Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So.2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
65. The court as a policy matter, to avoid the rule against perpetuities, may refrain
from finding a property interest. See cases cited supra first paragraph of note 51; GRAY,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 329 (4th ed. 1942).
66. Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theatres, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So.2d 537 (1956) (reservation of a right to repurchase held to be a limitation on the fee in the nature of a condition subsequent, hence grantors had presently vested privilege of repurchase similar to
power of termination); Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D. 421 (1879) (also
construing grantor's pre-emption as presently vested right, but overruled by London & So. W.
Ry. Co. v. Gomm, supra note 61).
67. A future interest is vested when there is no condition precedent to its taking effect
in possession, other than the termination of the prior estate. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v.
West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919) ; SimES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 79 (1951).
68. Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1951) (dictum); Dozier
v. Troy Drive-In-Theatres, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So.2d 537 (1956) ; H. J. Lewis Oyster Co.
v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 AUt. 138 (1919) (dictum); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Ad.
312 (1914); Herzog v. Mattern, 367 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1962) (dictum); SMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 110 (1951).
69. A reversion is a future interest left in the grantor when a lesser vested estate is
conveyed to another. Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272
(1960); SIMES, FUTURE INTEREESTS § 9 (1951); SMITH, REAL PROPERTY 123 (1956).
70. A vested remainder is an interest in a transferee created simultaneously with a
prior estate and is so limited that there are no conditions precedent to its becoming a
possessory estate other than the termination of the prior estate. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v.
West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919) ; Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (1914);
SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 10 (1951).
71. Interests already in possession are considered as being vested. SIMES, FUTURE INTERE Ts § 79 (1951).
72. Srmss, FUTURE INTERESTS § 110 (1951). They were recognized before the rule
arose and hence the rule was molded so as not to impinge on these traditionally accepted
interests. Statutes are common, however, limiting the duration of possibilities of reverter
and powers of termination. Massachusetts, Maine and Connecticut sensibly make the
limitation applicable also to interests created in favor of a third person following a
defeasible fee. See 5 Pow.LL, REAL PROPERTY, ff 827E[2] (1962) for citations and further
discussion.
73. Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d 448 (1950); Institution for Say. v.
Roxbury Home, 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923); Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182
Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960) (dictum); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 304-310 (4th ed. 1942). A possibility of reverter is a future interest left in the
grantor upon conveyance of a fee simple determinable or fee simple conditional. Alamo
School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960); GRAY, THE RULE
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feiture rights not favored by the courts, the courts will avoid constructions
resulting in a possibility of reverter or power of termination
unless
75
expressly provided for or clearly implied by the parties.
Having noted the general applicability of the rule to various interests,
its applicability to pre-emptions or rights of first refusal will now be
considered. Keeping in mind the probable consequences of classification,

namely, that it is likely to be held either subject to, or excluded from, the
rule accordingly as it is deemed more like one type of interest than
another, 76 the predilection of the courts,7 7 to use their own descriptive
labels, is understandable.
A pre-emption, as previously noted, 78 can be exercised only when the
property owner desires to sell. It is, then, subject to a condition precedent;
it is a contingent interest,79 and thus, it normally is subject to the rule. °
If the pre-emption is held by the grantor, or having been originally
created in him and then assigned to a third party or property owner's
association, it is possible to analogize to the possibility of reverter or
power of termination" and argue that it should be excluded from the
rule. However, it is generally recognized that excepting reverter interests
from the rule is an anomalous product of history, and the anomaly should
not be extended. If the pre-emption is held by the grantor and is so
worded and so construed as to be personal to him so that it will last no
AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 304-10 (4th ed. 1942); SrmEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 12 (1951);
SMITr, REAL PROPERTY 127 (1956).
74. Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theatres, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So.2d 537 (1956); Hinton
v. Gilbert, 221 Ala. 309, 128 So. 604 (1930); Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App.
2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960); Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919)
(A power of termination is a future interest left in the grantor on the conveyance of an
estate subject to a condition subsequent.); SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 13 (1951); SMrrH,
REAL PROPERTY 129 (1956); GRAY, TnE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 304-10 (4th ed.
1942).
75. Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac. 451 (1887); Dodd v. Rotterman, 330
Ill.
362, 161 N.E. 756 (1928).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 51-75.
77. See supra Part III. That courts are assimilating functional equivalents to arrive at
rational solutions of perpetuities problems, see Lynn & Ramser, Applying the Rule Against
Perpetuities to Functional Equivalents: Copps Chapel and the Woburn Church Revisited,
43 IOWA L. REv. 36 (1957); Lynn & Van Doren, Applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to
Remainders and Executory Interests: Orthodox Doctrine and Modern Cases, 27 U. CHI. L.
REV. 436, 460 (1960); Lynn, PerpetuitiesReform: An Analysis of Developments in England
and the United States, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 508, 516 (1965).
78. Supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
79. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 At. 138 (1919); Roberts v.
Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30 N.E.2d 392 (1940); Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.
App. 1955); 6 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 413, comment (1944).
80. This was the holding in the following cases: Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141,
15 Pac. 451 (1887); H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Ad. 138 (1919);
Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1124 (1918) ; Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277
S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955) (but finding only the rule against restraints' violated).
See also 6 AMEaiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.66 (Casner ed. 1952).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
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longer than his life, 2 then, of course, the pre-emption cannot be exercised
beyond the period of the rule and will be valid whether otherwise subject
to the rule or not.
If the option feature of the pre-emption is emphasized, then prima
facie the rules applicable to options should apply,8" and the pre-emption
should be subject to the rule. In the situation contemplated herein, the
pre-emption, and hence the option, is not normally incident to a lease so
that those exceptions84 will not apply. However, the policy behind those
exceptions may well dictate a contrary result in many instances.
The pre-emptive agreement in connection with the purchase of
condominium units bears little resemblance to the ordinary option in
gross. The unit owners (who comprise the association), have an undivided
interest in the underlying fee plus various easements and contractual
rights and duties. A similar situation might exist in a traditional horizontal
subdivision where each lot owner is required to be a member of a property
owner's association or club, and the association is accorded the right of
first refusal. In these instances, arguments that the pre-emptive agreement promotes rather than restricts alienability and land improvement
have a certain amount of cogency. Thus, considerations which except lease
options might also except these pre-emptive agreements from the rule.
Condominium and similar considerations aside, however, it has been held
that option provisions which grant a right of first refusal create contingent
equitable interests 8 and are subject to the rule."
Pre-emptive provisions, often if not generally, take the form of contractual agreements or covenants. Thus, if the covenant aspect is emphasized, the rule exempting agreements strictly contractual, 7 or the
rule applicable to covenants, 8 might exclude pre-emptive agreements
from the rule against perpetuities. Although the determination of what is
strictly contractual is not without difficulty, 9 it is believed that a right of
pre-emption does create a contingent interest in property, and hence, it
is not within the contractual exception to the rule.
82. See infra text accompanying note 108.
83. Supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
84. Supra notes 62 and 63.
85. Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960);
H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Ad. 138 (1919); Maddox v. Keeler,
296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W.2d 568 (1944); Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188,
380 P.2d 931 (1963); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64 (Casner ed. 1952); SIMEs,
FuTTuR INTERESTS § 110 (Hornbook Ser. 1951).
86. Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957); H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v.
West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 At. 138 (1919); Gilbert v. Union College, 343 S.W.2d 829 (Ky.
1961); Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950); Maddox v. Keeler,
296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W.2d 568 (1944); Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn. 506, 241 S.W.2d 548
(1951); Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931 (1963).
87. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY,
767B (1962).
88. 5 POWELL, supra note 87,
775.
89. Id. at f" 767B.
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The proper reconciliation of these divergent considerations is not
easy. Further, condominium statutes, with their authorization of an
owner's association with regulatory powers,90 seem to sanction, impliedly
if not expressly, the use of pre-emptive and other devices to control
92
occupancy. Florida"' and a few other condominium statutory states
forthrightly avoid the problem by declaring that the rule against perpetuities shall not be applicable to condominium instruments and agreements. A statutory solution is always possible and often desirable. However, many condominium statutes" do not contain such provisions, and
those that do, of course, limit their applications to such units. The right
of pre-emption may be employed in the traditional subdivision as well as
in many other transactions.
Considering the pre-emption right in its broader aspects, the conclusion that it creates a contingent interest in property seems convincing.
Thus, under the traditional view it is subject to the rule against perpetuities unless excepted by statute or judicial decision more sensitive to
substance than form."sa
Having established that a right of first refusal, whether it be called
a pre-emption or an option to repurchase, is such an interest as to be
generally subject to the rule against perpetuities, the operational aspects
of the rule will now be considered. In order to facilitate a discussion of
the operation of the rule, the material begins with a brief analysis of its
component parts:
"No interest is good"-The effect of a violation of the rule is to make
the contingent interest void ab initio.94
"unless it must vest"--In this respect, vesting in interest within the
period of the rule is sufficient although possession may be postponed
beyond the period.9 5 In addition, the fact that vesting within the required
period is highly probable will not save the contingent interest if there is
any possibility that it may not vest within the period of the rule.9"
90. See for example: ALASKA STATS. §§ 34.07.220-240, 34.07.450(4) (1963); AR.

REV.

STATS. §§ 33-551(5), 33-561 (1964 Supp.); IA. CODE ANr. §§ 499B.14 and 499B.15 (1964
Supp.); OHIO REV. CODE: §§ 5311.08 (1964); WIs. STATS. ANN. §§ 230.71(4), 230.88 (1965
Supp.).
91. FLA. LAws 65-387 (1965), amending FLA. STAT. § 711.08(2) (1965).
92. ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 30, § 320 (1964 Supp.); MissouRi STATS. ANN. § 448.210
(1964 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-28 .(1963 replacement vol.). The above statutes also

exclude condominiums from the rule prohibiting unreasonable direct restraints on alienation
whereas the Florida statute, supra note 91, mentions only the rule against perpetuities.

93. See, for example, the statutes of the states cited supra note 90.
93a. See infra text to notes 160-162 and the first paragraph of the conclusion.
94. SmEs, infra note 98, § 109.
95. Salisbury v. Salisbury, 92 Kan. 644, 141 Pac. 173 (1914); SmITH, REAL PROPERTY
162 (1956).
96. Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W.2d 568 (1944). The common law rule
against perpetuities is to be tested by possibilities, not probabilities or actualities.
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"if at all"-The rule provides that the contingent interest must
either vest or fail within the period.97 Thus, the rule only requires that the
alternatives be determined within the period. It is not required that the
interest does in fact vest.
"twenty-one years after some life in being"-A life in being is a
natural person or group of natural persons, readily ascertainable at the
inception of the interest, whose life or lives are used to measure the
period within which the interest must vest or fail to vest. The maximum
permissible period of the common law rule is twenty-one years after the
death of all of the persons used as measuring lives. This period may be
extended, however, to include applicable periods of gestation at either or
both the beginning and ending of the period.9 8
"at the creation of the interest"-The measuring lives must be in
existence when the contingent interest is created by the instrument taking
effect.
C. OperationalTime Periodof the Rule
The time factor is obviously the critical operational aspect of the
rule. The general rule is that a contingent interest relating to the purchase
of real property, such as a pre-emption or option, violates the rule against
perpetuities if the time for the exercise of the interest is either unlimited9"
97. Selman v. Robertson, 46 S.C. 262, 24 S.E. 187 (1895); STMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 109 (1951).
98. Long v. Blackall, 7 T.R. 100, 101 Eng. Rep. 875 (1797); Equitable Trust Co. v.
McComb, 19 Del. Ch. 387, 168 Ati. 203 (1933); SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 108-109 (1951).
But a nine month period, unconnected with an actual period of gestation of any person,
could not arbitrarily be added to the period of the rule. Cadell v. Palmer, 10 Bing. 140,
131 Eng. Rep. 859 (H.L. 1833).
99. Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1951) (contingent option
to repurchase, indefinite period violates rule); Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App.
2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960) (contingent option to repurchase, indefinite period violates rule) ; H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919) (pre-emption,
unlimited period violates rule); Gearhart v. West Lumber Co., 212 Ga. 25, 90 S.E.2d
10 (1955) (repurchase option for condition violated, unlimited period violates rule); Turner
v. Peacock, 153 Ga. 870, 113 S.E. 585 (1922) (option to purchase, perpetual period
violates rule); Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1124 (1918) (pre-emption unlimited period violates rule); Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950)
(option to repurchase, unlimited period violates rule); Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440,
177 S.W.2d 568 (1944) (option to repurchase, unlimited period violates rule); Roberts
v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30 N.E.2d 392 (1940) (pre-emption, unlimited period violates
rule); Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N.E. 352 (1892) (need consent of grantor to
sell, unlimited period violates rule) ; Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d
588 (Mo. App. 1958) (option to purchase, unlimited period violates rule); MaGee v.
Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 343 Mo. 1022, 124 S.W.2d 1121 (1938) (option to
resell, unlimited period violates rule) ; Gange v. Hayes, 193 Ore. 51, 237 P.2d 196 (1951)
(contingent option to repurchase, indefinite period violates rule); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa.
348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914) (option to repurchase, indefinite period violates rule); Starcher
Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S.E. 524 (1907) (option to purchase, indefinite extensions
in time permitted, violates rule); London & So. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562
(1880) (option to purchase, unlimited period violates rule); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 394 (4th ed. 1944). The text statement is dicta in some of the above cases.
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or extends beyond the period of the rule.1"' The reason the rule is violated
is that the interest which is to be acquired by purchasing the land is not
necessarily going to vest or fail within the period of the rule.' 0 ' Rather,
there is always the possibility that the interest will never vest or if it does
vest, it may not do so until after the period has run. In either case, the
operational aspect of the rule is violated and the interest is void.
D. Saving Provisions by Construction
A pre-emption or option which would otherwise violate the rule
against perpetuities can often be saved by construction. This is true
although the courts pay lip service to the established rule of property that
the rule against perpetuities is not a rule of construction but is a peremptory command. °2 In addition to the classifying technique already
discussed,0 2 a another method might be called the doctrine of reasonable
time. This doctrine may be employed when no time is designated in the
instrument for exercise of the provision. 1 3 The rationale is that the
intent of the provision was only to permit postponing of the exercise for
a reasonable time and not indefinitely. 0 4 However, this technique is not
used when the instrument clearly indicates the intended duration of the
option, including an indefinite period into the future, nor is it used unless
there can be read into the provision some term of limitation requiring
pre-emptions or options to be exercised within some reasonable time.' 01
The basis for the strict adherence to the rule is that the court will not
make a new contract for the parties which is contrary to their intentions. 0 6 In addition, such a construction would make it very difficult to
fix any standards to determine a reasonable time. 10 7
100. Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177
(1920) (covenant to repurchase, 25-year period violates rule) ; Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va.
193, 85 S.E. 170 (1915) (option to repurchase, 99-year period violates rule) ; RESTATEIMENT,
PROPERTY § 394 (4th ed. 1944).
101. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919).
102. Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957); Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky.
249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Ad. 312 (1914); 41 Am.
Jura., Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 12 (1942).
102a. See supra text to notes 41 and 77.
103. MaGee v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 343 Mo. 1022, 124 S.W.2d
1121 (1939); Rice v. Lincoln & N. W. Ry. Co., 88 Neb. 307, 129 N.W. 425 (1911);
Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1963). Reasonable time is a question of fact
depending on the circumstances.
104. MaGee v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., supra note 103; Mattern v.
Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1963).
105. Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955) (finding no violation of the
rule against perpetuities but a violation of the rule against restraints); Barton v. Thaw,
246 Pa. 348, 92 Ad. 312 (1914); Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 371, 56 S.E. 524 (1907) ;
Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1958) (voiding
the provision as an unreasonable restraint on alienation).
106. Ibid.
107. Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955); Missouri State Highway
Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1958).
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A further device, by which the courts save provisions from the rule
against perpetuities, is to construe the interest created by the provision as
personal to the holder of the right and as such, not violative of the rule.' 08
The cases hold that if there are two possible constructions of an instrument, one of which will validate it and the other will render it void,
preference will be accorded to the construction which will uphold the
provision. 0 9 Also, there is the feeling that, although a grant is to be
interpreted in favor of the grantee, a reservation of a pre-emption or
option should be construed as personal to the grantor, so as not to violate
the rule. 1 0 As a result, the provision will be construed as personal to the
interest holder unless there is clear evidence of contrary intent."'
E. Effect of Violation of the Rule
The general effect of a pre-emption or option violating the rule is
quite clear. If the sole subject of an instrument is the creation of a
purchase option which fails to meet the requirements of the rule, then the
entire contract is void ab initio. 112 However, if there is a conveyance of
land with a right to repurchase (pre-emption or option), created therein,
which pre-emption or similar provision violates the rule against perpetuities, then only the pre-emption or similar provision is void, and the
initial conveyance remains valid and effective." 8 The consequences of a
void pre-emption agreement in a typical condominium setting would be
the probable failure of the whole regulatory scheme. The unit owners
would retain title to their individual units freed of the unenforceable preemption provision.
108. Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957); Alamo School Dist. v. Jones,
182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960); Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 Pac.
451 (1887); Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950); Old Mission
Peninsula School Dist. v. French, 362 Mich. 546, 107 N.W.2d 758 (1961); Kershner v.
Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955). Such a construction will not violate the rule
because the interest must vest or fail within the life of the option holder. If the interest is
descendible rather than personal, it would have to be weighed against the common law
rule against perpetuities.
109. Roemhild v. Jones, supra note 108; Campbell v. Campbell, supra note 108; 41
AM. JuR. Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 12 (1942).
110. Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960).
The result is consistent with the rule of construction favoring the grantee if the rule
against perpetuities is disregarded. By construing the reservation as personal to the
grantor, there is less derogation from the grant to the transferee than if the reservation
is to last for an indefinite period. However, if perpetuities is considered so that an
indefinite reservation is void, then the most favorable construction for the grantee is

that of a pre-emption to last indefinitely, as in such a case the grantee acquires his
estate immediately freed of the unlawful pre-emption.
111. Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950); Old Mission Peninsula School Dist. v. French, 362 Mich. 546, 107 N.W.2d 758 (1961); Kershner v. Hurlburt,
277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955).
112. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Ad. 138 (1919).
113. Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theatres, Inc., 265 Ala. 93, 89 So.2d 537 (1956).
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V.

THE RULE AGAINST SUSPENSION OF THE ABSOLUTE POWER
OF ALIENATION

A. Line-up of Jurisdictions

Statutes prohibiting the suspension of the absolute power of alienation are in effect in a limited number of states. The first state to enact such
a statute was New York,' 14 and the New York statute served as the basis
and model for similar enactments in other jurisdictions." 5 In recent years,
the trend has been away from the suspension type statute as many states
have returned to a form of the common law rule against perpetuities." 6
B. The Rule Stated

Although there are variations in suspension statutes, the basic effect
on future interests is to void every indestructible contingent future interest which, by any possibility, may suspend the absolute power of
alienation for a longer period than is prescribed by the statute." 7 Such
114. N.Y. REv. STAT. Part 2, ch. 1, tit.
2, §§ 14-21, 23, 63 (1830).
115. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 33-261 (1956); CAL. CIV. CODE § 715 (Deering 1949); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 45-102 (1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1949); IND. STAT. §§ 51-101,
103 (Bums 1933); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.220 (1955); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 554.14
(1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.13 (1947); MONT. REV. CODE § 67-406 (1962); N.D.
CENTURY CODE § 47-02-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
60, § 31 (1949); S.D. CODE
§ 51.0231 (1939); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.14 (1957).
In 1963 Arizona repealed itssuspension statute and enacted the common law rule
against perpetuities. ARIz. LAWS 1963, c.25, § 2 as to repeal, § 1 as to the common law
rule creating ARIZ. REV. STAT. 333-261.01 (1964 Supp.). In 1959 California repealed its
provisions relating to suspension and left intact the common law rule against perpetuities,
CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 470, §§ 1, 3, 5, and 7. Indiana repealed suspension provisions in 1945
and adopted the common law rule against perpetuities. IND. AcTs, 1945, c. 216, § 6, as to
repeal; IND. STAT. ANN. § 51-105 (Burns 1955) as to perpetuities. Kentucky repealed
its suspension statute in 1960 and adopted the common law rule against perpetuities
modified by "wait-and-see" provisions coupled with cy pres. Ky. LAWS 1960, c. 167,
enacting Ky. REv. STAT. § 381.215, and repealing § 381.220 (1960). In 1949 Michigan repealed its suspension provisions and adopted the common law rule against perpetuities.
MIcH. COmP. LAWS § 554.51 (Mason Supp. 1961); the repealed §§ are MIcH. ComP. LAWS
§§ 554.14-20, 554.23 (1948).
116. As to Arizona, California, Indiana, Kentucky and Michigan, see supra note 115.
In addition, Montana in 1959 adopted the common law rule against perpetuities and reformed its suspension statute to comply with the common law period. MONT. REV. CODES,
§§ 67-406, 67-407 (1961 Supp.). This is similar to the reform undertaken in New York.
See infra note 120. In Oklahoma the decisions under the suspension statute are said to be
the same as if the common law rule against perpetuities were in effect. 5 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY, 838.44 (1962).
117. Many of the statutes expressly so provide. See, for example, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 716 (1951) (now repealed); D.C. CODE § 45-102 (1954); MICE. COMp. LAWS § 554.14
(1948), now repealed.
A more detailed explanation of the effect of the suspension statute, specifically the
New York statute, on future interests is contained in 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 698-699
(1962 ed.).
Most of the limitations of future interests which arguably offend any one of
these rules against perpetuities involve a suspension of the power of alienation.
Such a suspension exists whenever (a) an indestructible remainder or executory
interest in [sic] limited in favor of a person or of a class on a condition precedent,
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power of alienation is said to be suspended when there are no persons in
being who can convey an absolute fee in possession."'
The statutes at one time differed considerably as to the time period
during which the power of alienation might be suspended. The initial rule
adopted by New York was the "two lives" rule which prohibited the
suspension of the power of alienation for a period longer than two lives
in being at the creation of the estate." 9 That period remained substantially unchanged in New York until significant amendments were enacted
between 1958 and 1960, as a result of which the period was enlarged to
multiple lives in being and twenty-one years. 21 In other jurisdictions, the
period is generally "lives in being" plus a specified period.' 21 Further, as
in the case of the rule against perpetuities, the lives selected to govern the
time of suspension must not be so numerous or so situated that evidence
of their deaths would be unreasonably difficult to obtain. 22
or in favor of a class in a form found vested subject to open, and (b) neither the
ascertainment of the ultimate taker or takers, nor the ascertainment of a group
from among whom the ultimate taker or takers must be selected, is presently
possible. Thus a suspension of the power of alienation exists whenever an indestructible future interest is limited in favor of a person or persons unborn at
the time the deed or will containing the limitation speaks; or in favor of a class
where persons, born after the time the deed or will containing the limitation speaks,
can become members thereof; or in favor of a person or persons so described
that neither the persons nor the group from among whom the takers are to be
selected is ascertainable until the fulfillment of some contingency. (The author's
footnotes are omitted.)
118. This is the usual statutory definition. See, for example, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 42 (McKinney 1965 Supp.). The cases are generally in accord. Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich.
347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955); Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926);
Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 159 N.W. 966 (1916); Buck v.
Walter, 115 Minn. 239, 132 N.W. 205 (1911); Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193, 85 S.E.
170 (1915).
119. The statute also provided, as to realty, for a period of minority so that a contingent remainder in fee could be created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect if the
person to whom the first remainder is limited, dies under the age of twenty-one or any
other contingency occurs before he reaches majority. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42 (McKinney 1945).
120. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42 (McKinney 1965 Supp.); PERS. PROP. LAW § 11
(McKinney 1962). A child conceived but not yet born may be counted as a life in being.
The rule is similar under the common law rule against perpetuities.
The New York statutes were construed as also having a remoteness ingredient (SIMES,
FUTURE INTERESTS, 4'21 (1951), so that in effect the present New York law contains both
the common law rule against perpetuities and the suspension rule, with the same period
applicable to both. Specific statutory provisions are designed to preclude invalidities based
on improbable contingencies (N.Y. REL PROP. LAW § 42-c; PERS. PROP. LAW § 11-b), and
a limited cy pres provision (N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42-b; PERS. PROP. LAW § 11-a), is in
effect.
121. D.C. CODE §§ 45-102-45-104 (1940) (lives in being plus twenty-one years);
IDAHo CODE § 55-111 (1957) (lives in being plus twenty-five years); MONT. REV. CODE
H9 67-406-07, 67-512-18 (1959) (lives in being plus twenty-one years); N.D. CENTURY
CODE §§ 47-02-27, 47-02-31, 47-0411-418 (1960) (lives in being plus twenty-one years);
OKLA. ST. ANN. § 60-175.47 (1960) (lives in being plus twenty-one years); Wis. STAT.
§ 230.14; 230.15; 230.33 (1949) (lives in being plus thirty years).
The former Arizona provision was two lives and twenty-one years, ARiz. REV. STAT.
§ 33-261 (1956), and the former Kentucky statute was two lives and twenty-one years and
ten months. Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.220 (1955).
122. This common law evidentiary rule in perpetuities cases is sometimes codified by
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C. Comparisonof the Common Law Rule and the Statutory Rule
The effect on future interests' 23 of the common law rule against
perpetuities and the statutory rule against suspension of alienation will
now be considered. Both rules are measurements of the possible duration
of indirect restraints on alienability of property. The common law rule
requires timely "vesting" of future interests. This requires that all contingencies must be resolved so that applicable future interests will either
fail or become absolute or unconditional within the period of the rule.' 24
The suspension rule merely requires that any conditions which prevent
the alienation of absolute ownership by preventing the ascertainment of
all possible owners of the entire interest must cease to be effective within
the prescribed period.' Conditions which suspend alienation are those
which operate to make an owner of a future interest unascertainable or
the extent of the interest uncertain. 2 ' The statutory rule is unconcerned
with whether the interest will vest during the period; it is enough if every
owner of every interest is ascertainable so that they may all join together
27
and convey an absolute fee in possession.
D. Test of Alienability under Both Rules
The two laws are distinguishable with regard to the test applied in
determining whether alienability is unlawfully restrained. The common
law rule applies the "practical possibility" test. 2 ' This test provides that
if ownership of an interest in land is not absolute or unconditional
(vested), then the saleability of the property will be impaired because the
parties must first agree on the value of the contingent interest and by
that time the chance to sell may be lost or the parties may never agree.
Thus the common law rule is concerned with the practical possibility of
alienation. On the other hand, the suspension rule requires only that the
statute. See, for example, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42 (McKinney 1965 Supp.); PERS.
PROP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1962).
123. The effect of the two rules on other interests, as, for example, the duration of
trusts, is omitted as being outside the scope of this paper.
124. Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 6 Mnix¢. L. REV. 560
(1922) ; SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 109 (1951).

125. Fraser & Sammis, The California Rule Against Restraints on Alienation, Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation and Perpetuities, 4 HASTINGS L.J. 101 (1953);
Newman, Perpetuities,Restraints on Alienability and the Duration of Trusts, 16 VAND. L.
REv. 57 (1962); Norvell, The Power of Alienation: Direct Restraint vs. Suspension, 31
N.Y.U.L. REV. 894 (1956). It is not necessary that the ultimate holders be individually
ascertained; it is sufficient that all possible takers be ascertained as a reasonably sized
group so that each member can release his possibility and all who have interests can
join in conveying in absolute fee.
126. SitaEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 122 (1951); Newman, supra note 125.
127. Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); Mineral Land Inv. Co.
v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 159 N.W. 966 (1916); Buck v. Walter, 115 Minn. 239,
132 N.W. 205 (1911); Epstein v. Werbelovsky, 193 App. Div. 428, 184 N.Y. Supp. 330
(1920); Newman, supra note 125.
128. Newman, Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienability and the Duration of Trusts, 16
VAND. L. REV. 57 (1962); Powell, Suspension of the Power of Alienation, 19 MIcH. L. REv.
235 (1921).'
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owners of future interests become identified so that it is legally possible
for them to join in a sale of the property. Under the suspension rule, the
practical possibility of their actually joining to convey is immaterial. The
only requirement is that all owners of all interests in the particular realty
be ascertained within the designated period so that by acting in concert
they can convey a fee simple absolute.'"
E. Applicability to Pre-Emptions

Since ascertainment of all interest holders is the crucial issue, it
should logically follow that options generally do not violate the suspension
statute as long as they are limited to persons or entities ascertained or
ascertainable within the period of the rule. 180 This follows from the fact
that the option holder can join with the fee owner and together they can
convey an absolute fee simple title. Thus, the power of alienation is not
suspended.
The same conclusion of non-violation should apply equally to preemptions or contingent options to repurchase.'
Although the actual
vesting of the interest in the grantor or other holder is contingent on the
desire of the grantee to sell, the suspension rule is not violated unless the
non-vested interest (pre-emption) is limited to persons who will not or
may not be ascertained within the period of the rule. This is because the
suspension rule is not concerned with remoteness of vesting but only with
the existence of persons capable of conveying absolute ownership.
If the pre-emption is construed as being personal to the grantor or
other natural human holder thereof, it is obvious that the rule cannot be
violated. 2 There are always persons in being who can convey an absolute
title, and further, the pre-emption cannot last longer than one life in
being. Even if the right of first refusal is descendible to the heirs of the
holder, at any one time the holder or holders of the pre-emption will be
ascertained, and such holder or holders can join with the fee holder in
conveying an absolute ownership.' 88 In essence, the pre-emption holder
releases his pre-emption and the power of alienation is not suspended for
an instant. Kentucky cases 8 4 reaching a contrary result may be attributed
129. Supra notes 125 and 127.

130. The text rule is the holding of the following cases: Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 138,
68 Pac. 587 (1902); In re City of N.Y., 246 N.Y. 1, 157 N.E. 911 (1927); In re Hauser,
50 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. 1944) (dictum since option construed as personal); Epstein v.
Werbelovsky, 193 App. Div. 428, 184 N.Y.S. 330, aff'd 233 N.Y. 525, 135 N.E. 902 (1922);
see also 5 POWELL, REarL PROPERTY 701 (1964).
131. Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926).
132. Bates v. Bates, 314 Ky. 789, 236 S.W.2d 943 (1951) (option to repurchase held
personal and valid); Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950) (preemptive option to repurchase found personal and valid).
133. Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926).
134. Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W.2d 568 (1944) (option to repurchase);
Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 290 Ky. 132, 160 S.W.2d 654 (1942) (pre-emption), both holding
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to a lack of appreciation of the differences between the rules prohibiting
perpetuities, suspension, and direct restraints on alienation. 18 5
In the event that the pre-emption is so created that it is to last indefinitely and be exercisable against an indefinite succession of fee owners,
a more difficult problem might be presented. A plan such as this may
be envisioned in a typical vertical or horizontal subdivision where the
pre-emption is given to a property owners' association with the provision
that whenever any individual owner desires to sell, the association has
the right of first refusal. Since the pre-emption is to apply to successive
owners, it may appear that a non-releasable interest is created. If this is
so, it would then seem that the absolute power of alienation is suspended
that the options were void but not clearly distinguishing between perpetuities, suspension,
and direct restraints.
135. In DUKEMINIER, PERPETUITIES LAW IN ACTION 55-56 (1962), it is stated:
(author's footnotes omitted)
In more than one hundred years and one hundred cases this problem was
never finally resolved in Kentucky. At one time or another the Court of Appeals
interpreted the statute as forbidding (a) interests which vest too remotely, (b)
interests which suspend the power of alienation, and (c) direct restraints on
alienation. The reviser of statutes, by his heading supplied in 1894 and adhered
to until the act was repealed in 1960, assumed it incorporated rule (c). The express
words of the statute enacted rule (b). Yet the court in recent years favored the
view that it embodied rule (a). In 1956 the court, noting the confusion in interpretation, stated: [Taylor v. Dooley, 297 S.W.2d 905, 907-08 (Ky. 1956).]
The proper view is that the statute, as embodying the rule against perpetuities,
is concerned with the remote vesting of estates rather than restraints on
alienation of vested estates despite the language of the statute . . .However,
it is unnecessary to decide that the statute may not be applied to restraints
on alienation.
Three years later, in 1959, the court again dealt with the "unfortunate confusion"
caused by the statute. Admitting that in recent cases the statute had been construed
as prohibiting remote vesting, the court nonetheless concluded that "the common
law rule against suspension of the power of alienation has existed in the common
law of this state regardless of the troublesome statute." [Robertson v. Simmons,
322 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1959).] Now here is an odd twist: to read the express
language out of the statute, and then to bring the express language back in as a
common law rule (which Gray said it never was). While there is an authoritative
ring to this statement of the court, it cannot be taken at face value. Quite clearly
the court did not mean to refer to the rule against suspension of the power of
alienation at all, but to the rule against direct restraints on alienation, with which
it has frequently been confused and which is discussed in Chapter 6.
As there never was an authoritative construction adhered to by the court, no
one can really say what the statute meant. Only one thing is reasonably clear.
The common law rule against remote vesting was in force prior to the statute
and was repeatedly declared to be in force while the statute was on the books.
Whatever else the statute did, it did not change that rule, except possibly to extend
the common law period by ten months.
In 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 829-830 (1962 ed.), it is stated:
It has been repeatedly said by the courts of Kentucky that this 1852 (suspension) statute was "declaratory of the common law." It is clearly true that
during the period of this statute most of the Kentucky decisions on questions of
the operation of the rule against perpetuities were exactly what one could have
expected in an unadulterately pure common law jurisdiction.
Powell refers to the Saulsberry case, supra note 134, as being invalid as a direct
restraint on alienation, 5 POWELL, 832, n.46 (1962 ed.); but Dukeminier refers to both
Saulsberry and Maddox, supra note 134, as being void under the rule against perpetuities.
DUKEM GnER,PERPETUrrIEs LAW iN ACTIoN 40 (1962). The possibility of options and preemptions also being subject in Kentucky to the rule prohibiting direct restraints is discussed
by DUKEMINIER, supra at 128-131.
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during the continuance of the regulatory scheme. Disregarding the obvious policy question as to whether a non-releasable pre-emption could
be validly created, it is submitted, however, that the plan does not have
such an inherent vice. The property owners' association is made up of
the same persons who own the property, and those owners may at any time
decide to discontinue the scheme,.. 6 abolish the association, and relinquish
or release the pre-emptive right. Thus, there always are persons in being
who can convey an absolute ownership. The probability or improbability
of their doing so is immaterial in determining whether the absolute power
of alienation is suspended.
VI.

THE RULE AGAINST DIRECT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

A. The Rule Stated
The rule prohibiting direct restraints on alienation is designed to
prevent the creation of inalienable interests in property. 13 A direct
restraint may be defined as one which prohibits or penalizes the exercise
of the power of alienation. 18 The rule against direct restraints is readily
distinguishable from the rule against perpetuities. The perpetuities rule
voids any indestructible contingent future interest which may "vest" too
remotely.'" Thus, the title becomes less fragmented and the practical
possibility of alienation is increased. 4 ° The rule against direct restraints,
when violated, confirms the estate in the grantee and then frees such
estate from the illegal restriction on alienation.''
The direct restraint rule is also distinguishable from the rule prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation.' 42 In the first
place, the suspension rule is strictly statutory, 4 ' and the direct restraint
rule is a creature of the common law. 44 Secondly, the suspension rule
prohibits those situations where the absolute or complete ownership of
specific property (land, chattels, intangibles) cannot be alienated because
of the nonexistence of persons whose combined interests permit the
transfer of complete ownership. 43 The direct restraint rule precludes the
creation of inalienable interests (fee, life estate, remainder) in property
136. Condominium statutes generally provide procedures for removal of the property
from the condominium law and for termination of the regime. See, for example, FLA. STAT.
§ 711.16 (1963).
137. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.2, at 411-12 (Casner ed. 1952).
138. SIMEs & SMITH, FuTREa INTERESTS § 1112 (2d ed. 1956).
139. See supra note 137.
140. See supra text accompanying note 128.
141. SmIEs & SMITH, supra note 138, § 1169; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note
137, § 26.83.

142. See supra Part V.
143.
ment of
144.
145.

DUKEMINIR, PERPETUITIES LAW IN ACTION 118 (1962). Cf. the confused statethe court in Robertson v. Simmons, 322 S.W.2d 476 at 481, 483 (Ky. 1959).
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 2, 165 (2d ed. 1906).
See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
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and makes those interests freely transferable by voiding the restraint. 4"
A direct restraint by itself does not necessarily suspend the absolute
power of alienation as there may be persons in being who, having the
power to enforce it, can release it and permit the conveyance of an absolute fee simple.' 47
B.

Classificationof Restraints

Direct restraints on alienation are generally classified as disabling,
promissory or forfeiture 4 ' according to the manner in which the particular restraint operates. Sometimes the promissory restraint is overlooked or minimized with a dichotomy approach of disabling versus
forfeiture restraint. 49 Forfeiture for attempted alienation is a penalty
commonly employed, but presumably it is not the only penalty that can be
utilized. The payment of damages for breach of a promise not to alienate
might in a nontechnical sense be regarded as a penalty or cost for violating
the restraint. Thus, if a twofold classification should be used, disabling
versus penalty rather than disabling versus forfeiture would seem preferable. Penalty as a more inclusive term would include forfeiture as well as
any other exaction that might be imposed. Since the rules as to the validity
of forfeiture and promissory restraints are the same, 5 0 it may be advantageous to treat the two types of restraints under one broad heading.
In this paper, however, the three categories will be considered.
A disabling restraint is a provision in a conveyance depriving the
grantee of the power to transfer his interest. If effective, a disabling
restraint would render any transfer by the grantee inoperative and void.''
Such a restraint, with one exception, 5 2 on either a legal or equitable
146. DUiKEmINIER, supra note 143, at 115.
147. For example, a deed provision that on alienation the grantor, 0, would have the

power to terminate the grantee's estate, or that the estate should automatically revert to
0, would constitute a direct restraint on alienation, but 0 could release his interest to the
grantee or join with him in conveying so that an absolute fee title would be vested in either
the grantee or his transferee.
148. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§

404

(1944);

SimEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS

§

1131 (1956); Fraser & Sammis, The California Rule Against Restraints on Alienation,
Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation and Perpetuities, 4 HASTINGS L.J. 101,
103, 104 (1953) ; Norvell, The Power of Alienation: Direct Restraint vs. Suspension, 31
N.Y.U.L. REv. 894, 896 (1956).
149. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.2, 26.6 (Casner ed. 1952) ; GRAY, RESTRAINTS
ON ALIENATION § 10 (2d ed. 1895), using the terms "Restraints on Alienation" and "Forfeiture

for Alienation"; Schnebly, Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 YALE L.J.
1186, 1380 (1935).
150. SrwES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 104 (1951); Fraser & Sammis, supra note 125.
151. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.7 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 404 (1944); SitaEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1131, 1136 (1956); Fraser & Sammis,

supra note 148; Norvell, supra note 148.
An example of a disabling restraint is a conveyance by A to B in fee simple with the
provision that B shall have no power to convey the estate. B is therefore deprived of one
of the incidents of his ownership of property.
152. Such a restraint imposed on the beneficial interest enjoyed under the terms of a
valid spendthrift trust, is valid. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 405 (1944); STaES & SMITH,
supra note 151, § 1146.
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estate, is153generally invalid whether applied to fees simple or to lesser
interests.
A promissory restraint is a covenant by the grantee that the estate
conveyed to him will not be subsequently conveyed for the period of the
self-imposed restraint.'54 The law treats such a restraint in the same
manner as a forfeiture restraint, and when the latter is valid, so is the
former."" Even if a promissory restraint is specifically enforceable, it
does not follow that it is more like a disabling restraint than a forfeiture
restraint. The promissory restraint, unlike the disabling restraint, does
not attempt to remove alienability as a characteristic of the estate; instead it simply purports to restrict the grantee in the exercise of the
power of alienation incident to his ownership. In other words, a disabling
restraint if valid cannot be removed once it is imposed, but a promissory
restraint can be removed by joint action of the promisor and the promisee in a manner similar to the removal of a forfeiture restraint by the
cooperation of the one entitled to enforce the forfeiture. 56
A forfeiture restraint restricts the grantee's alienation by a provision for a change of ownership in the event of alienation. 7 Such a restraint leaves intact the attribute of alienability but imposes a penalty
for its exercise. As a result, it is generally invalid when annexed to any
type of fee simple in land. 5 ' Forfeiture and promissory restraints, however, are generally upheld when attached to lesser possessory interests,
as, for example, in the case of life estates and terms for years.' 59
153. 6 AMERICAN

26.15-26.17, 26.34, 26.51 (Casner ed. 1952) ; RE405 (1944); SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1137-1143 (1956);
Fraser & Sammis, supra note 148; Norvell, supra note 148.
Of course the restraint may vary considerably as to its duration and scope. It may be
unqualified as to both time and permissible alienees; it may be limited in duration and
as to permissible alienees; or it may be limited as to the mode of alienation. Under such
a wide possibility of permissible variables, unanimity of decisions is not to be expected.
The authorities cited in this note should be consulted for the significance of the variables
mentioned and for case citations.
154. SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1131 (1956); Fraser & Sammis, supra note
148; Norvell, supra note 148.
An example of a promissory restraint is a conveyance from A to B with a covenant
that B will not alienate the property conveyed.
155. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 104 (1951); Norvell, supra note 148.
156. Simes, supra note 155, § 104. See also supra note 147.
157. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.19-26.21 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 404 (1944); SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1147-68 (1956); Fraser
& Sammis, supra note 148, Norvell, supra note 148.
An example of a forfeiture restraint is a conveyance by A to B, in fee simple, with
the provision that if B should alienate the property, it shall either (a) revert to A; or (b) be
forfeited and A may enter or repossess; or (c) the estate of B shall pass to X.
158. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 157, §§ 26.19-26.21; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY, supra note 157, §§ 406-408, promulgating a rule of reasonableness applicable to
forfeiture restraints; SIMES & SMxrI, supra note 157, §§ 1148-1155. It is to be noted that the
text states a general rule and that there are some decisions upholding limited forfeiture
restraints on fees simple. See above authorities for citations.
159. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 157, §§ 26.48-26.51; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY, supra note 157, §§ 409-410; SImEs & SmITI, supra note 157, §§ 1157-1158.
LAW OF PROPERTY §§

STATEMENT, PROPERTY §
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Pre-emptions and options to repurchase, reserving or creating a
right of first refusal in the grantor or a third person, have been treated
variously by the courts, sometimes being discussed in terms of the rule
against perpetuities and sometimes in reference to the rule prohibiting
direct restraints on alienation. 160 The fact is that some pre-emptions
which would be invalid under the rule against perpetuities do not substantially affect alienation,' 6 ' and that others which would be valid
under perpetuities law do seriously interfere with alienation.6

2

Pre-

emptions, if considered a direct restraint on alienation, should be classified as promissory or penalty restraints in that they arise from covenants
63
made by the grantee and not by a mere declaration of the grantor.
The Restatement of Property takes the position that promissory or forfeiture restraints on fee simple ownership are valid if reasonable. 4
There is, however, considerable authority to the contrary.' 65 Thus, a
pre-emption under the Restatement position, even if regarded as a penalty
restraint, could be valid in any jurisdiction upholding reasonable direct
restraints on the alienation of fees simple.
The terms of any particular pre-emption agreement determine
whether alienation is factually impeded at all, and, a fortiorari, whether
any such impediment is reasonable. Factors which affect alienability
and which have been considered in determining reasonableness are: (a)
the duration of the restraint; (b) the method of determining the price
to be paid; and (c) the purpose for which the restraint is imposed. 66
A fourth factor which apparently has escaped serious consideration is
160. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.67 (Casner ed. 1952); SIMES & SMITH, LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 1154 (1956), concluding that for the most part pre-emptions have
been controlled primarily by the rule against perpetuities; DuKEMINtIER, PERPETUITIES
LAW IN Ac'rso 128 (1962); cases cited in the above references; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 413 (1944).
161. For example, a pre-emption at the offeror's own price, or at the market price,
when required to be exercised within a brief period after the offer is extended, has a
negligible effect on alienability even if of unlimited duration but is violative of the rule
against perpetuities. Somewhat illogically, however, if the same pre-emption is held by a
grantor and is in the nature of a right of re-entry for condition broken, then it is excepted
from the common law rule against perpetuities unless otherwise regulated by statute. See
supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
162. For example, a pre-emption limited to a life in being exercisable at a fixed sum
which is substantially below market price seriously impedes alienability although it does
not violate the rule against perpetuities. See infra text accompanying note 185.
163. Norvell, The Power of Alienation: Direct Restraint vs. Suspension, 31 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 894 (1956).
164. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 406 (1944).
165. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1148-1151 (1952), both authorities citing some
minority cases, however, upholding limited or reasonable restraints. In § 1150.5, 1955
Supp. to Simes and Smith, an argument is made against the point of view that all states
have to some extent adopted a rule validating reasonable restraints based on the fact
that in all states some restraints on some interests, for example, forfeiture restraints on
leasehold interests, are valid. It is said that the present procedure of developing categories of
estates and categories of restraints which are permissible is less litigation producing.
166. Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1958); 73
C.J.S. PROPERTY § 13 (1951).
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the time period during which the pre-emptionor has to decide whether
or not to purchase.
C. Duration of Restraints

The first area to be analyzed is the duration of the restraint. The
basic rule is that provisions imposing restraints on alienation for a
period which extends the right reserved for a long, unreasonable, or unlimited time, or beyond the period required for the vesting of future
contingent interests, are generally void as against public policy.' 6 7 The
courts, however, have differed as to whether to apply a "direct restraint"' 6 8 or "rule against perpetuities"' 6 9 test in order to determine
validity. There is also support for the position that the duration of the
70
restraint is immaterial.
7
Some jurisdictions have applied the rule of reasonable restraint' '
to restrictions on alienation. In determining reasonableness, the time
factor or duration of the restraint, although not the sole criterion, is
important. 7 2 A limitation of such restraints to the life of an individual 3
or for a short term of years 74 has been upheld as reasonable. In addition, there is some authority for provisions which have no time set for
their duration to be construed as meaning a reasonable time under
167. 41 Am. JutR. Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 41 (1942); 70 C.J.S.
Perpetuities § 13 (1951); SnIMs & SMITH, supra note 160, § 1154; See also Roemhild v.
Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957) (dictum) ; Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30 N.E.2d
392 (1940) (pre-emption and other alternatives lasting an unreasonable length of time void
as a restraint on alienation); Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, supra note 166;
Lauderbaugh v. Williams, 409 Pa. 351, 186 A.2d 39 (1962).
168. See infra note 171.
169. See infra note 177.
170. See infra note 180.
171. Beets v. Tyler, 290 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1956); Peters v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 161, 227 N.W. 917 (1929) (ten year disabling restraint on fee); Mattern
v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (option to purchase fee); Missouri
State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1958); 41 Am. JUR.
Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 71 (1942).
172. Gale v. York Center Community Co-op., Inc., 21 Ill. App. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30
(1960) (no restraint should be valid simply because it is limited in time, or because the
class of persons excluded is not total, or, because all modes of alienation are not prohibited); Roberts v. Jones, supra note 167 (pre-emption for unreasonable time is void);
Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, supra note 171; Peters v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., supra note 171; Mountain Springs Ass'n v. Wilson, 81 N.J. Super. 564, 196 A.2d
270 (1963) (unlimited promissory restraint invalid); Lauderbough v. Williams, 400 Pa.
351, 186 A.2d 39 (1962) (unlimited restriction void but a limited restriction might be valid
if not objectionable on other grounds); Mattern v. Herzog, supra note 171.
173. Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931 (1963) ; Kentland
Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 247 (1916). Kentucky has been very
liberal in upholding reasonable restraints on alienation. SinES & SMITH, supra note 160,
§ 1150.
174. Beets v. Tyler, 290 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. App. 1956) (pre-emption limited to twenty
years with renewal privilege for another twenty years).
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the circumstances. 7 ' However, this constructional technique is not employed when the duration of the restraint is clearly indicated.' 76
The majority of jurisdictions have imposed the test of the period
of the rule against perpetuities. 7 Since the policy behind both the rule
against perpetuities and the rule prohibiting direct restraints on aliena-

tion is the same, namely limiting the tying up of property so as to prevent the inhibition of the free exchange of land,7 8 there is a rational

basis for applying either or both rules. The application of the perpetuities
test to pre-emptive provisions has been criticized, however, on the ground
that it puts the duration of the provision above its actual effect as an
impediment to alienation. 7 9

Accordingly, many authorities consider the duration of a restraint

80
as immaterial when it is imposed upon a fee or other absolute interest.

175. MaGee v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 343 Mo. 1022, 124 S.W.2d
1121 (1939) (involving personalty resale option in which the purchaser of bonds could
force the seller to repurchase. The court limited the duration of the parole agreement to
a period not over 5 years which was the applicable statute of limitations.); Mattern v.
Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (option to purchase construed to be
limited to reasonable time which would not extend beyond administration of decedent's
estate and settlement of claims against the estate).
176. Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1958);
Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955).
177. Neustadt v. Pearce, 143 A.2d 437 (Conn. 1958) (unlimited option to repurchase at
market price held void under rule against perpetuities); Gearhart v. West Lumber Co.,
212 Ga. 25, 90 S.E.2d 10 (1955) (option to repurchase void under rule against perpetuities) ;
Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920) (covenant
to repurchase for twenty-five years violates the rule); Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky.
249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950) (option to repurchase for unlimited period violates the rule);
Gilbert v. Union College, 343 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. Ct. App. 1921) (option to repurchase for
120 days did not violate the rule); Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d
588 (Mo. App. 1958) (option to purchase adjoining lot for unlimited period violates the
rule); MaGee v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 343 Mo. 1022, 124 S.W.2d
1121 (1939) (option to resell for unlimited period violates the rule) (dictum); Gorge v.
Hayes, 193 Ore. 51, 237 P.2d 196 (1951) (option to repurchase for indefinite period violated
rule); Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn. 506, 241 S.W.2d 548 (1951) (option to repurchase
good under the rule against perpetuities is valid under rule against restraints on alienation)
(dictum); Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (option to purchase
not unlimited as to time and upheld); Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188,
380 P.2d 931 (1963) (pre-emption was within the rule against perpetuities and is upheld);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 394 (1944).
Rountree v. Richardson, 180 So.2d 152 (Ala. 1959), applying only the rule against
perpetuities, held a fixed price pre-emptive option unlimited in time valid when reserved by
the grantor. See Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theatre, Inc., supra note 36.
178. Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920);
Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn. 506, 241 S.W.2d 548 (App. 1951).
179. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.66 (Casner ed. 1952).
180. Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955); Sibley v. Hill, 331 S.W.2d
227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), upheld pre-emption in oil and gas operating agreement when
the price was to be the offer received from a prospective purchaser and the agreement to
last as long as oil, gas or other minerals are produced from the land covered by the leases;
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.66 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 413
(1944); See also SimEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1154 (1956); contra, Neustadt v.
Pearce, 143 A.2d 437 (Conn. 1958), applying rule against perpetuities.
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These authorities suggest that the controlling factor as to the validity
of the provision should be its restraint on alienation and it should not
pass or fail on whether it meets a time requirement. If a provision can
facilitate the alienability or improvement because it is an acceptable
commercial device, it should not be barred because the interest created
may not vest within a set period of time.''
D. Method of Determining Price to be Paid
The second factor affecting alienability of land subject to a preemption is the price to be paid in the event that the grantee desires to
sell. The price to be paid or its method of ascertainment determines
whether the pre-emption is a practical impediment to alienation.
The first illustrative example is a pre-emption at the offeror's price.
If no price is specified, it has been held that the pre-emptionor must pay
the price asked by the selling owner.' 82 Conversely, the owner, in good
faith, must request no more than that which he would ask of another
purchaser' 88 as otherwise the pre-emption right could be defeated by
asking for more than the actual value of the property. A pre-emption at
the offeror's own price has no adverse effect on alienation.",
A second illustrative example affords a holder of the pre-emption
the right to purchase at a fixed price which is far below the actual value
of the land at the time the grantee desires to sell. The general rule in
this case is that there is an obvious restraint on alienation and the rule
against restraints is violated. 85 The reasoning is that an owner will
retain his property rather than sell at a great sacrifice. 8 The same result and adverse effect on alienability is likely to occur in any pre-emption exercisable on a fixed price because such price is probably based
on the value of the land at the time the pre-emption is created. Insofar
as the pre-emption price is concerned, it is felt that the extent of the
restraint varies with the amount of the refusal price.' 87 Thus, if the price
181. Ibid.
182. Jackson v. Schutz, 18 Johns. 174 (N.Y. 1820); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 26.65 (Casner ed. 1952).
183. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.65 (Casner ed. 1952).
184. 6 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.65 (Casner ed. 1952); SimEs & Smrrir, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 1154 (1956).
185. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 At!. 138 (1919) (provision for
fixed price in pre-emption held invalid both as a direct restraint and as a violation of the
rule against perpetuities); Brace v. Black, 51 N.J. Super. 572 (1958), fixed price preemption invalid although limited to lives in being; Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone,
311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App. 1958) (provision for fixed price in covenant: held invalid);
Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931 (1963) (provision for fixed
price in covenant held valid; In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1884); 6 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.65 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEIENT, PROPERTY § 413 (1944).

186. Kershner v. Hurburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 26.65 (Casner ed. 1952).
187. Beets v. Tyler, 290 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. App. 1956); Kershner v. Hurlburt, supra note
186.
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to be paid compares favorably with the value of the land when alienation is desired, the restraint will be slight and may be upheld. However,
if the stipulated price is fixed substantially lower than the then current
value of the land, the restraint is considerable and should be invalidated.
Another line of cases declines to adopt the general rule about stipulated prices and holds that a pre-emptive option with a fixed price is not
void even though the prior agreed price is not indicative of current
value. 8 The rationale of this opinion is that although the grantee is
required to give the pre-emptionor the first chance to purchase the property, the pre-emptionor would either buy or refuse to buy. If he buys,
alienation is achieved. If he refuses, the property owner may sell to
anyone else. The result is that alienation is not tied up, as a matter of
law, even for a moment's time.' 9 The proponents of this view further
contend that even if practical alienability is restrained in some instances,
the primary purpose of the rule is to enable a particular person to buy
the property and not to prevent anyone from selling it.
A third situation relating to pre-emption price is the provision for
exercise of the right at market price. This type of provision does not
differ materially from an offer at the offeror's own price which is considered valid as imposing no restraint. 10
A requirement of offer to the pre-emption holder at the best bona
fide price offered by responsible third parties has been declared valid.'
This is similar to the situation where the offer is at the market price,
since it is unlikely that the owner would be willing to sell to anyone for
less than the best available price.
The final illustrative example involves a provision that the preemptionor may repurchase the property at a fixed price plus the value
of improvements. Such a provision as a restraint is substantially equivalent to a provision for repurchase at a fixed price alone unless the value
of the improvements raises the purchase price to the level of the value
of the property when the grantee desires to sell .' 2 Thus, the rule applicable to pre-emptions at a fixed price should control.
188. Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 138, 68 Pac. 587 (1902); Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich.
347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955); Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225 N.W. 620 (1929);
Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); Mineral Land Inv. Co. v.
Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 159 N.W. 966 (1916); SImEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 1154 (1956).
189. Ibid.
190. Supra note 182; Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961) (12 year
pre-emption at fair market value to be determined by appraisers upheld).
191. Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1956); Beets v. Tyler, 290 S.W.2d 76
(Mo. App. 1956); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.65-.67 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 413 (1944).

192. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919).
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E. Purpose for which Restraints Imposed
In jurisdictions following the rule that direct restraints on alienation are valid if reasonable under the particular circumstances,' 1 3 the
purpose of the restraint may be determinative. If a socially or economically desirable objective can be accomplished by enforcing the provision,
then the restraint may be validated on the basis of public policy.'9 4
Thus, the public policy against restraints on alienation may be relaxed
where the circumstances convince the court that it is a reasonable means
of accomplishing another purpose recognized as proper and beneficial
to society.'9 5
F. Time to Exercise Pre-Emption
The time within which the holder of the pre-emption has to exercise his discretion to buy or not would appear to be a significant factor
in determining whether the right of repurchase is an invalid restraint
on alienation. If the time for this election is very short, it may well be
that the effect is insignificant and justifies the apparent neglect of this
factor. Thus, for example, if the period is limited to two weeks, it is
likely that any prospective purchaser will wait that long for the preemptionor to make up his mind, the fee owner will not be unduly hindered, and the land will be alienated in due time to either the prospective
purchaser or the pre-emption holder. If, however, the period for deciding is considerably longer, it would appear that alienation is in fact restricted during that period.
In Blair v. Kingsley,'96 and in Gale v. York Center Community
Co-op., Inc.,'9 7 the holder of the pre-emption had one year in which to
make up his mind. In the Blair case the possible effect of the rule prohibiting direct restraints on alienation was not discussed, while in the
193. Roemhild v. Jones, supra note 152; Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.
App. 1955) ; Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 350 P.2d 931 (1963).
194. Ibid.; Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957) (indicating that reasonable
restraint for legitimate and reasonable purpose might be valid); Gale v. York Center
Community Co-op., Inc., 21 Ill. App. 2d 86 (1960) (upholding cooperative housing association's right of pre-emption as an acceptable means of community control and development);
Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1955) (found that a pre-emption in favor
of adjoining lot owner was for the purpose of restricting alienation and therefore void);
Mountain Springs Ass'n v. Wilson, 81 N.J. Super 564, 196 A.2d 270 (1963) (contained a
similar promissory restraint and was likewise held invalid, the court stressing that the
covenant was unlimited in duration, unreasonable in the number of permissible alienees,
and unconscionable in granting association officers control over prospective purchasers).
In Lauderbough v. Williams, 409 Pa. 351, 186 A.2d 39 (1962), a promissory restraint of
apparent unlimited duration requiring the consent of all but two members of a property
owners' association was held unreasonable and void. The requirement of approval by so
many other persons without guiding standards was the chief vice of the scheme, the court
apparently concluding that the predominant purpose was a restraint on alienation.
195. 41 AM. JUR. Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 71-76 (1942); 73 C.J.S.
Property § 13(b) (1951). See supra note 194.
196. Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
197. 21 Ill. App. 2d 57, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960).
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Gale case it was held that the restraint on alienation was not unreasonable and therefore valid, the court considering primarily the purpose of
the restraint and not the time limit for exercising the pre-emption. It
does seem, however, that until the pre-emptionor makes up his mind or
the time allotted transpires, alienation cannot take place. Even if the fee
owner were willing to convey immediately to the purchaser, the purchaser would not want to buy if shortly thereafter he has to honor the
pre-emption. As the pre-emption period is extended, the probability of
finding purchasers willing to await the expiration of the period during
which time the purchaser is committed but the owner is not, becomes less
and less likely. Many purchasers may be willing to wait a short time,
possibly for two weeks or even thirty days, but certainly many would
be unwilling to wait for as long as a year. And if the time period were
to be extended to five or ten years, it would appear that practically the
land would become inalienable except as to possibly the most determined
purchasers. Thus, the court should insist that the time provided for the
pre-emptionor to make up his mind be limited to a reasonable period
under the circumstances.
VII. CONCLUSION

In the absence of statutory policy declaration, or specific precedent,
the pre-emption or right of first refusal as a mechanism for controlling
the occupancy of land is legally feasible but somewhat hazardous. First,
the pre-emption being contingent on the owner's desire to convey is clearly
within that class of interest which traditionally have been held subject to
the rule against perpetuities. This result is unfortunate in that form is
elevated over substance. It is submitted that the pre-emption should be
subject only to the more logical test of its practical effect as a direct
restraint on alienability. Second, the pre-emption normally does not violate
the statutory rule prohibiting the suspension of the power of alienation.
Hence, in jurisdictions having such a rule, the suspension rule itself need
be of no concern. Third, the pre-emption may be so drafted as to have a
significant effect on the alienability of property. Hence, cognizance must
be taken of the rule prohibiting direct restraints on alienation, and the
provision must be so worded as not to exceed permissible limits of restraint
in a particular jurisdiction.
Thus, although not many cases have specifically so held, it seems
that both the applicable rule against perpetuities and the rule prohibiting direct restraints on alienation regulate the terms of pre-emptions.
Therefore, if a pre-emption violates either rule, it will probably be held
void. In a few jurisdictions, as, for example, Kentucky,1 98 it may be
significant which rule is considered a primary governing factor. For example, if there is created a pre-emption at the offeror's price to last in198. See supra text note 115.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

definitely and to be exercised if the then current owner of the land ever
desires to convey, the restraint, because of its duration, might be considered unreasonable under the Kentucky doctrine of reasonable restraints, and the pre-emption invalidated. On the other hand, if Kentucky's perpetuities rule with cy pres provisions were applied first, the
duration of the pre-emption would or could be reduced to a period of
twenty-one (21) years, and this period could be regarded as reasonable
so as to validate the reformed pre-emption.'"9
In the absence of statutes or specific holdings exempting pre-emptions from either or both rules, draftsmen must exercise care in order
to avoid invalidity when creating pre-emptions exercisable by property
owners' associations for the purpose of controlling land use. Insofar as
the rule against perpetuities is concerned, no period in gross in excess
of twenty-one (21) years would be valid. No particular human lives
in being would be significant, and, of course, the life of a condominium
regime or property owners' association could not be used. Invalidity
could be avoided by the use of an artificial period of time, using multiple
lives carefully selected, plus an extended period of twenty-one (21)
years. 200 In this manner, the plan is almost assured of lasting for a
considerable period of time and validity under perpetuities is assured.
Further, at the expiration of the period there is nothing to prevent the
interested parties from entering into a renewal or new agreement.
Insofar as the rule prohibiting direct restraints is concerned, the
purpose should be manifested that the pre-emption mechanism is used
to insure a community of compatible and financially responsible persons
and not for the purpose of restraining alienation. The price to be paid
for the exercise of the pre-emption should be the market price of the
land or unit, the offeror's designated price, the price that a bona fide
third party purchaser is willing to pay, or a price established by disinterested appraisers. The price should not be a fixed price, the original
cost plus improvements, or any other amount which might not approximate the fair market value at the time of the proposed sale. Further, the
duration of the pre-emption should be limited in the same manner so
as to avoid the perpetuities problem, and the period accorded the preemptionor in which to make up his mind should be reasonably brief.
Aside from the legality of the pre-emption as a regulatory device,
the practicality and advisability of using it to control the occupancy of
land is another matter. An expert conveyancer 201 of condominium regimes
199. DUK.,MINIER, PERPETUITIES LAW IN AcTIoN 130 (1962).

200. For example: The pre-emption afforded the Association in this agreement shall
last until twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor of A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H,
1, and J. The named individuals may be ten healthy babies or youngsters from families
having a favorable history of longevity.
201. McCaughan, The Florida Condominium Act Applied, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 44-45
(1964).
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has questioned the desirability of giving the right of first refusal to the
association of unit owners. First, the association in order to exercise
such pre-emption needs a supply of funds which can only be acquired
by assessing the unit owners. If many units are purchased in this manner,
the additional cost may be prohibitive to the association members.
Further, while the apartments are owned by the association, there is
no way for those apartments to contribute to the maintenance of common
expenses other than by increased costs or assessments against the owners
of the individually owned units. These increased costs to unit owners
may in turn deter prospective mortgagees who may have doubts as to
the separate owners' ability to pay such costs over a protracted period.
Also, insofar as mortgagees are concerned, any restrictions on the right
to purchase at foreclosure sales might make mortgages on property subject to pre-emption and other alienation restrictions a most unattractive
investment. Thus, alienability may be factually impeded in a somewhat
circuitous manner.
As an alternative to the pre-emption right, the suggestion has been
made that the association of owners be given the right to supply a purchaser when the owner wishes to sell.2" 2 The association, by keeping
current a list of prospective purchasers, would actively help a unit owner
to find a suitable purchaser. A provision of this type, if properly worded,
would appear to be a help to alienation rather than a hindrance. Thus,
it should not be held violative of the rule against restraints on alienation. If the right to supply a purchaser is simply regarded as a covenant,
it would be excluded from the rule against perpetuities. It is believed
that the fact that the covenant might be enforced in equity, most likely
by injunction but possibly by specific performance, would not necessarily result in the conclusion that it creates an interest in land and thus
must conform to the rule against perpetuities. Restrictive covenants as
to use, except racially restrictive covenants, have traditionally been enforced in equity and have been regarded as exempt from the rule against
perpetuities.
The pre-emption and similar regulatory devices will undoubtedly
continue to be used in instruments creating new housing developments
and communities. Much thought and ingenuity can be expended in drafting the appropriate instruments to insure that the area will be reasonably
protected without impairing the saleability of the individual parcels. Protection of the community is required not only in the case of voluntary
sale but also in the case of transfer by gift, intestate succession, devise,
execution sale, and mortgage and lien foreclosure sale. The promulgation of a successful plan requires a nice balancing of conflicting considerations and a due appreciation of applicable laws.
202. Ibid.

